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Abstract.  University rankings widely affect the behaviours of prospective students and 
their families, university executive leaders, academic faculty, governments and investors 
in higher education. Yet the social science foundations of global rankings receive little 
scrutiny. Rankings that simply recycle reputation without any necessary connection to 
real outputs are of no common value. It is necessary that rankings be soundly based in 
scientific terms if a virtuous relationship between performance and ranking is to be 
established, the worst potentials of rankings are to be constrained, and rankings are 
optimized as a source of comparative information. The article evaluates six ranking 
systems, Shanghai ARWU, Leiden University, QS, Scopus, Times Higher Education and U-
Multirank, according to six social science criteria and two behavioural criteria. The social 
science criteria are materiality (rankings must be grounded in the observable higher 
education world), objectivity (opinion surveys should not be used), externality (ranked 
universities should not be a source of data about themselves), comprehensiveness 
(rankings should cover the broadest possible range of functions), particularity (ranking 
systems should eschew multi-indicators with weights, or proxy measures) and ordinal 
proportionality (vertical distinctions between universities should not be exaggerated). 
The behavioural criteria are the alignment of the ranking with tendencies to improved 
performance of all institutions and countries, and transparency, meaning accessibility to 
strategy making designed to maximize institutional position. The pure research rankings 
rate well overall but lack comprehensiveness. U-Multirank is also strong under most 
criteria but stymied by its 100 per cent reliance on subjective data collected via survey.  
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University rankings and social science1 
 
 
Introduction: Global university ranking 
 
Since the first Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) in 2003 global 
rankings have transformed higher education. A 2011 report for the European 
Universities’ Association on Global University Rankings and their Impact states:  
 
… the arrival on the scene of global classifications and rankings of universities has 
galvanised the world of higher education. Since the emergence of global rankings, 
universities have been unable to avoid national and international comparisons, and 
this has caused changes in the way universities function (Rauhvargers, 2011, p. 68).  
 
Rankings affects the judgments and decisions of many university leaders and faculty; 
prospective students, especially international students, and their families; state policy 
makers and regulators; and industry and philanthropic investors (Hazelkorn, 2008; 
2011). Many faculty express disdain for rankings, because they are based on the wrong 
criteria, or overly narrow the purposes of higher education, or exacerbate competition, 
and/or are methodologically flawed. Some university leaders claim to stand aloof. Yet this 
performance indicator exercises an almost hypnotic power. At a time when nations see 
themselves as ‘global competition states’ (Cerny, 1997) and global comparisons gather 
significance in many domains (OECD, 2013a; 2013b), university ranking fills a data gap. It 
renders the arcane and complex world of universities simple, transparent and compelling. 
Ranking seems democratizing: it renders accountable institutions that once held 
themselves above the common herd. It fits with old ideas about university status and 
modern contests like football league tables. It is easily understood and remembered.  
University ranking also speaks to desire. Every research university wants to improve 
its rank. Many institutions with a primarily teaching mission feel the lack of rank. Faculty 
want to be associated with prestigious institutions. Students want to be selected by them. 
The desire to rise is universal, as Adam Smith notes in The Wealth of Nations:  
 
The desire of bettering our condition . . . comes with us from the womb, and never 
leaves us till be go into the grave (Smith, 1776/1979, p. 441).  
 
Hence also there is an unquenchable desire for data about relative social position 
(Hirsch, 1976) as Pierre Bourdieu (1986) notes. Because university rankings order the 
status of institutions they regulate the relative value of graduate credentials. They affect 
the social position of many people. They have become an integral part of status culture.  
In short global university ranking is here to stay. In some jurisdictions ranking also 
has prior national roots, for example the annual US News and World Report ranking in the 
United States (USNWR, 2013). Largely managed by non-state organizations in publishing 
industry or within universities themselves, ranking has become a form of regulation as 
powerful in shaping practical university behaviours as he requirements of states. While 
some national cultures emphasize competition and position more than others Hazelkorn 
finds that institutional rank has become a primary performance measure for research 
university rectors, vice-chancellors and presidents. It is the one universal performance 
indicator, more important than student numbers (only some universities want to grow) 
or revenues (money is a means to university status). All executive leaders are impelled to 
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pursue policies designed to enhance their institution’s rank on the basis of the 
performance indicators incorporated in ranking systems, even though few can win a 
game determined by research outputs or reputational surveys. Ranking reinforces the 
advantages enjoyed by leading universities. It celebrates their status and propels more 
money and talent towards them, helping them to stay on top. It is difficult for outsiders, 
emerging universities and countries, to break in. Rankings are not ‘fair’ to competing 
universities. The starting positions are manifestly unequal. Yet university ranking 
insinuates itself in a growing number of places over time. It seems irresistible. 
 
Rankings as social science 
 
Yet how sound are these data that fix social position? The most unnerving aspect of global 
university rankings is not their power to normalize and exclude—many other social 
systems do that, including ‘the economy’—but the shaky methodologies, the arbitrary 
definitions and scope for manipulation. University status starts to peel loose from its 
material foundations. Status becomes a circular game in which power makes itself. This 
highlights the importance of data quality and interpretative validity. If rankings are 
effectively grounded in real university activity there is potential for a virtuous 
constitutive relationship between university rank and university performance.  
Data quality and rankings validity are also matters of common good. Desire for status 
is not the only driver of fascination with rankings. Comparative data about universities 
have many possible uses. Though the potential of comparisons is not exhausted by the 
present rankings systems, the data already collected include numbers and rates of science 
publications and related citations, by discipline; student enrolments and staffing ratios; 
internationalization of students and academic faculty; income levels in selected areas; and 
so on. Again this suggests the need to tune global rankings (and other cross-border 
comparisons of higher education and research) to optimize the information generated. 
But where is the constructive discussion about reforming the rankings? There is a 
large academic and popular literature on university rankings. It is mostly driven by 
normative considerations, or descriptive, or provides practical guidance on how to 
maximize institutional position. There is also continuing (albeit futile) discussion about 
whether university rankings should exist. Much of the literature is transparently 
motivated by self or sectional interest; for example attempts to remove indicators 
unfavourable to one or another institution or country and replace them with ‘suitable’ 
measures. Academic papers discuss the implications for policy and regulation, and 
behaviours and systems, and global relations of power (e.g. Sauder and Espeland, 2009; 
Marginson, 2008). Many papers list and review the different rankings systems (e.g. Salmi 
and Saroyan, 2006; Usher and Savino, 2006; Cheng, 2010; Rauhvargers, 2011). Most 
extant comprehensive reviews are largely descriptive, or examine rankings primarily in 
terms of normative policy assumptions rather than principles of social science.  
University rankings are critiqued; but surprisingly, they are little critiqued as social 
science. It is surprising because the techniques used by university rankers are taken from 
research in sociology, economics, psychology, and business studies including market 
research. There is litle discussion and debate about what the different rankings measure 
and how, and related questions of data coverage and validity; the kind of discussion that 
distinguishes between good rankings and bad in scientific grounds. For example, the 
reliance on multi-indicators with arbitrary weightings—a method used by all well-known 
rankings systems but especially vulnerable to critique on grounds of validity—is scarcely 
mentioned. Why are established social scientists largely silent about university rankings? 
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Experts in social indicators or higher education seem reluctant to single out individual 
ranking systems for criticism. Some experts are complicit in rankings schemes; and 
perhaps certain rankers are de facto protected by their power to harm institutions.2  
Given that social science is largely silent it is unsurprising the rankings community 
also fails to take a rigorous approach. The rankings community tolerates all rankings. It 
seems to be widely accepted that no single ranking can be complete or perfect; and all 
rankings, being partial, are equivalent in merit—or at least that all rankers have an 
equivalent commercial or intellectual ‘right’ to practice, as if ranking is an inclusive club. 
After a decade of university rankings it is apparent that self-regulation by the rankings 
industry will not distinguish good rankings from bad on grounds of validity of data and 
methodologies or foster a common culture of improvement based on scientific principles. 
This was underlined by the decision of the International Ranking Expert Group (IREG) on 
15 May 2013 to certify the Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) global ranking (QS, 2013b) despite 
the problems of the QS rankings methodology (see below) and QS’s ‘star’ system.3  
 
This article 
 
In an ideal world it would not matter whether rankings rested on sound social science. 
Competition for status would be stilled. None would earn social esteem at the expense of 
others. All universities would be very good. Under these conditions global university 
ranking would be not just undesirable but absurd. Ranking exacerbates a market-like 
competition in higher education that is redundant, wasteful and destructive. Ideally, 
performance measures should not create a pattern of winners and losers. Yet is not the 
world we inhabit. Global rankings are a fact of life for research universities even in 
egalitarian systems with modest tendencies to -institutional hierarchy and contest. 
Rankings are consistent with older ideas of venerable university status; and in some 
systems, including those in the US, East Asia and Russia, higher education is openly 
stratified and defined as a ‘market’. Research capacity is both unequally distributed and 
the primary engine of university status. All of this sustains the ranking culture.  
It is necessary to critique the rankings culture and imagine a world beyond ranking 
and market simulacra, if such a world is to be achieved (Marginson, 1997, e.g. pp. 278-
281). Yet there remains the strategic issue of what to do about rankings in the present. 
The practical question is not how to get rid of university ranking—imposible in the 
foreseeable future—but how ranking might evolve so its negative effects are minimized, it 
better serves the common interest, and it provides optimal comparative information. 
In other words, while ordinal cross-border comparison is inevitable the forms of 
comparison are an open question. Existing rankings are not fixed and new rankings 
emerge all the time. Arguably, however, unless ranking is grounded in social science, then 
data will be misleading, ranking will have more perverse effects, and the comparative 
data it provides will have limited value. There is scope for change in ranking systems if 
there is the will to achieve it. A preferred approach to ranking should join social science 
foundations to a normative agenda to (1) improve the social science quality of rankings 
data, and (2) optimize the behavioural effects of rankings in relation to performance, and 
for the greatest  possible number of institutions and national systems not just some 
leading or upwardly mobile institutions. It is possible to design a better university 
rankings system in these terms. Such potentials are the starting point for this article.  
The next section proposes criteria for judging rankings. These criteria are then 
applied to selected global rankings systems. The conclusion summarizes the way forward. 
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Criteria for evaluating rankings systems 
 
At least eight criteria can be brought to bear in judging global rankings systems. The first 
six criteria relate to social science quality. The final two concern behavioural effects.  
 
Criteria designed to improve data quality 
  
The six criteria for improving the social science of rankings are materiality, objectivity, 
externality, comprehensiveness, particularity, and ordinal proportionality. 
 Materiality: The first test of good rankings is the extent to which they are grounded in 
higher education realities. The starting point of social science is accurate and consistently 
recorded observation. Indicators should measure higher education where it can be 
measured, with maximum precision. Following observation and data collection collation 
and interpretation of data should minimize the scope for the ranking organization to 
over-determine the material phenomena and frame the outcome of comparison. 
Objectivity:  Following from the materiality principle, rankings indicators should 
eschew subjective observations using measures such as Likert scales. While surveys may 
bring research close to the real higher education world the subjective filter compromises 
data authenticity and coherence. Surveys provide not data about the real world but data 
about opinions. These opinions may or may not rest on observation; individual survey 
respondents are not trained in the observational methods of social science; and subjective 
observations across a population do not use a common method. It is invalid to combine 
numbers thus derived within a unitary set. A Likert ‘4’ or ‘agree’ from person A may have 
different meanings to a Likert ‘4’ or ‘agree’ from person B but when collated the two ‘4’s’ 
or ‘agrees’ seem equivalent. The method is also imprecise. To derive a university ranking 
from opinion surveys, is like asking a group of people to guess the distance between the 
earth and the sun, and then use the average guess to determine the distance. It would not 
be good astro-physics. It is not good social science of higher education, either.  
All social science entails a subjective element, in that the researcher’s preconceptions 
are brought to bear on the research process. However one essential task of the researcher 
is to maximize openness to the material world and minimize the tendency to screen out 
what can be seen. Further, university ranking should not be a popularity contest. 
Subjectively-based ranking recycles established status. It reflects an historical hierarchy 
that may or may not be current. This is known as the ‘halo effect’4, whereby overall 
preconceptions colour specific judgments. Subjective data in higher education, such as 
student evaluation of teaching or academic ratings of universities, may be used for other 
research purposes such as measures of customer satisfaction and university reputation. 
Subjective measures should not be used for ranking. The bottom line is that survey data 
can vary on the basis of factors other than variation in the material world. In grounding 
university ranking materially there must be minimum ‘noise’ from subjective factors. 
Externality:  Rankings should be based on data from sources external to the 
universities being ranked. Data collection and interpretation should not be open to 
manipulation by parties affected. Ideally, rankings data should be drawn from global 
collections of data so all institutions are judged on a common basis. 
Comprehensiveness:  Rankings of universities should be as comprehensive as possible 
of university functions. Rankings of a particular aspect such as research should be as 
comprehensive as possible of that activity, ideally including all disciplines, all types of 
research input and output, graduate research in quantity and quality, all kinds of use and 
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impact of the outcomes of research, the positive effects of research on teaching, localities, 
cities and regions, the national economy, other countries, etc. Comprehensiveness should 
not be achieved by using measures invalid under other criteria such as objectivity.  
Particularity:  Rankings based on particular qualities should incorporate measures of 
those qualities consistent with those qualities in the real world. This means that measures 
of specific quality A should not be discounted, qualified or substituted for by measures of 
other qualities (B or C, D, etc.), unless quality A is in part or whole identical with quality B 
or C, D, etc. Further, particular qualities measured for ranking purposes should only be 
combined into a unitary calculation when it can be demonstrated these qualities form an 
identifiable whole in the real world that is proportionate to the ranking model.  
For example, it is reasonable to combine data for men with data for women on the 
basis of 50/50 where each grouping is y 50 per cent of the base population. However, the 
principle of particularity rules out proxy indicators, such staffing ratios as a substitute for 
measures of the quality of teaching, or data for men as a substitute for data on women and 
men combined. The principle of particularity also rules out composite indicators based on 
arbitrary weightings. A ranking that combines budgetary allocations (50 per cent) with 
research publication (50 per cent) is invalid as a measure of either budgetary allocation 
or publications. Each individual quality has been discounted by half not expressed in full. 
It is also invalid as an overall measure of the position of the university because there is no 
basis for the assumption that half the social value of a university lies in budgetary inputs 
and half in research publications, and other elements enter into the social value of a 
university, such as its teaching and service functions; and because the two qualities are 
not mutually exclusive. Budgetary input affects publication output and vice versa.  
Ordinal proportionality:  Ordinal ranks should not exaggerate distinctions between 
ranked universities. For example when there are fine differences between institutions in 
the 300s there seems no good reason to rank them vertically in a league table.  
 
Criteria designed to optimize behavioural effects on performance 
  
The two criteria for maximizing the behavioural effects generated by rankings are 
performance alignment and transparency. 
Performance alignment:  Any ranking system should encourage behaviours consistent 
maximization of absolute performance in all ranked institutions, and install a common 
dynamic of improvement, without compromising breadth and quality. This alignment is 
hard to achieve because (a) most ranking systems are reductionist, favouring some 
disciplines, institutions and types of work over others; and (b) rankings are structured in 
terms of relative not absolute performance. Competition for rankings is zero-sum. In a 
hierarchy the number of leading institutions is fixed, as always with positional goods 
(Hirsch, 1976; Marginson, 1997). Unmodified ranking-oriented competition tends to 
bifurcated outcomes (winners/losers). In building reputation, rankings help leading 
institutions to draw a more than average share of the resources necessary for high 
performance: status, money, talent. This tends to lock out others. League table hierarchies 
tend to function as partly closed systems that reproduce the oligopoly of leading 
institutions—unless the rankings system is modified to enhance contestability.  
One test of the extent to which rankings encourage all-round performance 
improvement is the scope for upward mobility, the entry and rise of new institutions. It is 
impossible to create a ranking system in which the process is entirely ‘fair’, in the sense of 
a level playing field (full contestability): historical inequalities ensure different starting 
positions positions. Nevertheless the scope for upward mobility can be increased.   
Table 1.  Evaluation of six university ranking systems 
 
Evaluation  
Criterion 
 
Academic Ranking 
of World 
Universities 
Leiden University QS Scimago Times Higher  
Education 
U-Multirank 
Materiality 
 
 
 
MEDIUM-STRONG  
Do graduate Nobels 
(10%) connect HEI?  
STRONG  
Publications, cites 
drive outcomes 
WEAK  
Outcomes strongly 
shaped by methods 
STRONG  
Publications, cites 
drive outcomes 
WEAK  
Outcomes strongly 
shaped by methods  
MEDIUM  
Good HEI connect but 
subjective data  
Objectivity 
 
 
 
STRONG  
Prizes, publications, 
citations only 
STRONG 
Publications and 
citations only 
WEAK  
Surveys 50% of 
absolute position 
STRONG 
Publications and 
citations only 
WEAK  
Surveys 34.5% of 
absolute position 
WEAK  
All indicators 
composed by survey 
Externality 
 
 
 
MEDIUM-STRONG 
HEIs may influence 
staff count (10%) 
STRONG 
All data collected by 
Web of Knowledge 
MEDIUM- WEAK  
Data in a few areas 
negotiated with HEIs 
STRONG 
All data collected by 
Scopus 
WEAK  
Data in some areas 
negotiated with HEIs 
STRONG 
All data collected 
externally to HEIs* 
Comprehensiveness 
 
 
 
MEDIUM-WEAK 
Part-comprehensive 
of research only 
WEAK 
Limited research 
data series only  
MEDIUM 
Reputation, research, 
internationalization  
WEAK 
Limited research 
data series only 
MEDIUM-STRONG 
As for QS plus PhDs, 
financial resources 
STRONG 
Many data teaching, 
research, services 
Particularity 
 
 
 
MEDIUM 
Multi-index though 
internally correlated 
STRONG 
Stand-alone 
indicators only  
WEAK 
Proxy, multi-index 
arbitrary weights  
STRONG 
Stand-alone 
indicators only 
WEAK 
Multi-index, arbitrary 
weights 
STRONG 
All indicators can be 
made stand-alone 
Ordinal 
proportionality 
 
 
MEDIUM 
Single ranks to 100 
then large groups 
STRONG 
Indicators permit 
valid single ranks 
WEAK 
Single ranks to 400 
then groups to 700 
 
STRONG 
Indicators permit 
valid single ranks 
WEAK 
Single ranks to 200 
then groups to 400 
 
STRONG 
Three broad 
categories, no ranks 
Performance 
alignment 
 
 
MEDIUM-WEAK 
Research bias. Nobel 
block in steep ladder  
MEDIUM 
Research bias. Clear 
goals. Steep ladder 
(MEDIUM) WEAK 
(Status). Fake range, 
volatility, mobility  
MEDIUM 
Research bias. Clear 
goals. Steep ladder 
(MEDIUM) WEAK 
(Status). Fake 
volatility, mobility 
STRONG 
Teaching, research 
service all rewarded 
Transparency 
 
 
 
MEDIUM 
Scaling opaque for 
non-specialists 
MEDIUM-STRONG 
Partly opaque for 
non-specialists 
WEAK 
Surveys and scaling 
opaque 
MEDIUM-STRONG 
Partly opaque for 
non-specialists 
WEAK 
Complex, surveys and 
scaling opaque 
MEDIUM 
Customization but 
surveys invisible 
* Areas where the author’s judgment is provisional and more data are needed. 
  Source of concept and table: author 
Transparency:  Indicators, measures and methods of compiling, computing and 
interpreting ranking data should be fully transparent to all parties. The more open and 
simple the better. Ideally it should be possible for any literate person to reproduce the 
calculations, from raw data to final product, and so understand the basis of ranking 
outcomes and respond in straightforward fashion to the incentive structure.  
 These eight criteria will now be applied to the evaluation of six university ranking 
systems: ARWU, Leiden, QS, Scimago, Times Higher Education and U-Multirank. The 
outcome is summarized in Table 1. The judgments, which are explained further in the 
next section, are approximate. No doubt some will be contested. 
 
 
Evaluation of six current rankings systems 
 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU) 
 
The Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU, 2013) uses a composite 
multi-indicator. University performances in each of the six indicators that comprise the 
index are scaled and combined in a single series to enable creation of a league table. The 
weightings between indicators are arbitrary, though because the indicators are all 
research focused performance in each indicator tends to correlate closely to performance 
in the other indicators (Cheng, 2011). The indicators are Nobel Prizes in the science 
disciplines and Fields Medals in mathematics won by graduates (10 per cent), the same 
awards won by current faculty (20 per cent), high citation faculty researchers (20 per 
cent) (ISI-Thomson, 2008)5, number of papers in Science and Nature in the previous five 
years (20 per cent), number of papers indexed in the Web of Knowledge citation list the 
previous year (20 per cent), and the above indicators combined and expressed on a per 
full-time faculty basis (10 per cent).  Universities are ranked from one to 100 and then 
grouped as 101-150, 151-200, 201-300, 301-400, 401-500. This is better ordinal 
proportionality than in the other multi-indicator rankings discussed here, though perhaps 
the format still exaggerates distinctions between universities ranked below 40-50.  
In terms of data quality ARWU has no areas of fundamental weakness. It strong 
points are materiality, objectivity and reliance on external data. These factors have 
generated a high level of trust in the ARWU (it also has first mover advantage as the first 
credible research ranking). ARWU is closely grounded in real world high science research 
output and impact: leading researchers, primary science publications, citations; though 
there are no indicators for graduate students or PhDs, and works in the humanities and 
part of the social sciences and professional disciplines are excluded because they are not 
globally comparable. The only doubt about its materiality is the weakness of the 
connection between education of a Nobel winner in the past, and present scientific 
capacity.6 All the ARWU data are objective: all can be observed and counted. Only the 
number of equivalent full-time faculty is open to manipulation by the ranked universities. 
However the ARWU is not comprehensive of all university functions and resources. For 
example it excludes teaching, social mission, resources and internationalization.  
 The incentive structure of the ARWU is transparent to research managers. It focuses 
the attention of universities and national systems on basic research; and encourages a 
strong relationship between ranking, performance objectives, and specific research 
management strategies like hiring Nobel Prize winners and high citation researchers, 
rewards for faculty publishing in Nature and Science, and growth of science papers. It 
elevates research-related objectives relative to teaching-related objectives, though other 
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forces also push research universities in this direction. However, few universities have 
the conditions and resources to achieve high ARWU rank. The Nobel indicators, 30 per 
cent of the index, are an additional barrier. Past Nobels are mostly confined to North 
America, Russia and Japan, constraining possible upward mobility. Top Asian research 
universities such as the National University of Singapore and Seoul National University in 
Korea tend to do less well in the ARWU than in other credible research rankings.   
 
Leiden University  
 
The Leiden (2013) ranking is issued by the Leiden University Centre for Science and 
Technology Studies (CWTS). It is not a composite multi-indicator. Leiden supplies 
separated rankings of universities, each based on single indicators, including the volume 
of science papers, volume of citations of those papers, citations per paper, the number of 
papers in the top 10 per cent of their field by citation rates, and the proportion of the 
university’s papers in the last category. The citation data are provided in both raw form 
and on a field-normalized basis, whereby the Leiden group adjusts the raw data to 
accounts for different rates of publication and citation in the various research fields.  
 The strengths of both the Leiden and Scimago (below) rankings are materiality, 
objectivity, and externality.  Leiden’s data are from Thomson-ISI Web of Knowledge. 
There is no combined index and no arbitrary weightings. Focusing directly on publication 
and citation numbers and comparative citation quality, and uncontaminated by multi-
indicator weights and subjective surveys, Leiden and Scimago bring data users close to 
research realities. Leiden offers more than Scimago on citation quality. Both use single 
indicators so they evade problems of ordinal proportionality. The use of single indicators 
lifts Leiden and Scimago to a higher level of quality as social science, compared to multi-
indicator rankings. These rankings step back and shape the outcome as little as possible. 
This frees the data user to interpret the data contextually and normatively as desired. 
The Leiden data are transparent in meaning and easy to read, though non-specialists 
may find field normalization to be opaque. Leiden and Scimago are less well known in 
higher education and public circles than ARWU, Times Higher and QS and have a modest 
role in determining university reputations. However, the Leiden rankings are highly 
regarded among specialists in research policy and management, and the study of science. 
Leiden provides an effective foundation ranking in support of strategies for maximizing 
the overall ranked position. Better performance in this ranking feeds into stronger 
performance in the ARWU and, with some distortion, Times Higher and QS, given that 
research outputs play a strong role in both, especially Times Higher. As with the ARWU, 
however (though without the Nobel barrier) the targets implied by Leiden are hard to 
achieve. Only strong research universities can compete. Like all bona fide research 
rankings, Leiden sustains upward mobility primarily among institutions where the 
investment in capacity is growing. It is not a universal performance driver.   
 
Quacquarelli Symonds (QS) 
 
The QS (2013a) ranking is a multi-indicator ranking that standardizes and scales data in 
five areas to derive a single league table. It uses a steep hierarchy with single ranks from 
1-400 and groups institutions in tens and fifties thereafter up to 700: it is weaker in 
ordinal proportionality than the other rankings discussed here. Small differences in 
performance have exaggerated effects. Like the Times Higher, which is similar in method, 
QS aims to be comprehensive of more than just research. Its indicators cover ‘academic 
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reputation’ for teaching and research (40 per cent), reputation among ‘graduate 
employers (10 per cent), ‘teaching’ using the proxy indicator staff-student ratio (20 per 
cent), citations per full-time academic faculty (20 per cent), and the proportion of faculty 
(5 per cent) and students who are international (5 per cent). The two reputation 
indicators are determined by surveys that together constitute half the QS ranking index. 
The correlation between the different indicators is much weaker than in ARWU (Cheng, 
2011). QS uses methods from market research not academic sociology. As often in market 
research, issues like response rate, survey cells and weights remain opaque. No 
information has ever been provided about which ‘graduate employers’ are surveyed.  
 QS rates poorly in the three areas where the research rankings do well: materiality, 
objectivity and externality. Fifty per cent reliance on surveys is high. This displaces the 
ranking process from observable reality; especially given that few survey recipients can 
make comparative judgments about more than two or three universities. The QS ranking 
is not a pure reputation ranking either because half the index is comprised by objective 
elements. But these observations of material higher education pass through a series of 
filters entailing QS decisions, and these filters shape the ranking outcomes, for example 
the arbitrary weighting between the indicators, and the scaling process: the conduct and 
compilation of surveys, including questions used, and interpretation of survey returns, for 
example whether to compensate for uneven returns by area; and also negotiations with 
institutions on number of faculty, and numbers of international staff and students.7 
Particularity is compromised by the multi-indicator and by the use of staff-student ratios 
as proxy for teaching quality (note also that a pure quantity measure is a poor proxy for 
quality). Some specific QS indicators provide valuable information, like the student-staff 
ratio and citations per faculty. The multi-indicator approach buries those useful data. 
The QS ranking is subject to much annual fluctuation, as is the Times Higher ranking. 
What determines this volatility? Does it indicate QS permits a higher degree of upward 
mobility than, say, ARWU? This volatility is a product of two elements. First, the multi-
indicator character of the ranking, in combination with many institutions close to each 
other in score and low correlations between indicators. Small changes in one indicator 
can sharply affect position. With poorly correlated indicators moving inconsistently in 
relation each other, there is much potential for random effects. Second, surveys provide 
half the ranking and are subject to year-by-year changes in the returns. In some years a 
third element adds volatility: methodological changes. This is fake volatility driven by 
ranking method, not real-world volatility based on openness and contestability. 
The large role played by the surveys also enables universities to improve their QS 
ranking following marketing and other reputational building activities, including gaming 
of survey returns. To this extent universities have better prospects of improving in this 
ranking in a short time than in ARWU, Leiden or Scimago. In this one respect, QS provides 
real rather than fake mobility. However, this upward mobility can be achieved only in 
relation to status and the effect on status is temporary. There is no necessary link from 
the improvement in status back to improved real performance, of the kind that delivers a 
sustained improvement in ranking, as with a lift in ARWU position. But in any case, in QS, 
especially below the top 30-40 universities, the relationship between performance and 
ranking is not transparent. It is crowded out by the many ways QS shapes the outcome. 
The relationship between performance and ranking may not be very strong at all.  
The QS rankings regime cannot necessarily lead to improved all-round performance 
for three reasons. First, there is no given theoretical base for the chosen indicators and 
their internal relations and weights, for example no coherent definition of production or 
performance. Second, if the arbitrary weights are shifted (e.g. citations per faculty is 10 
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per cent and internationalization is 20 per cent) there are major shifts in ranking 
positions without any concurrent change in real performance (Gladwell, 2011). Third, the 
relationship between real effort and real performance is filtered by QS methodologies and 
liable to be over-determined by surface fluctuations in position. This means that if there 
are positive effects in relation to performance generated by managing a university so as 
to maximize the QS ranking, these effects are essentially accidental. In that case it is 
difficult to see what benefit is served by the QS global rankings, aside from the 
commercial benefits to QS itself in marketing its higher education-related business.  
 
Scimago 
 
The Scimago data are based on the Scopus collection by Elsevier. Scimago provides data 
on all research organizations, not just higher education. It provides a much longer list 
than Leiden. The data can be adjusted so as to include only higher education institutions. 
There are also more research-related indicators than provided by Leiden but the data as 
presented are less accessible and explanations are more complex and less transparent. 
The most useful indicator of quality is ‘normalized impact’ that measures average 
citations. For the most part the issues in relation to the Scimago ranking are similar to 
those discussed in relation to Leiden. Scimago is strong in materiality, objectivity, 
externality, particularity and, because it is a set of single indicators not a composite multi-
indicator ranking, ordinal proportionality. Shaping by the ranking agency is transparent 
and modest. The data are confined to research and to a limited set of information about 
research, focused on primary scientific outputs and the global disciplines, and the 
academic impact of research in those disciplines as expressed though citation patterns.  
 As with the Leiden ranking and ARWU, Scimago provides a clear picture of the 
hierarchically distributed character of research outputs. Only strong research universities 
can compete successfully for upper level Scimago positions. One of the virtues of this very 
long list of research producers is that improvements lower down the scale are made 
visible. In that respect Scimago is more inclusive than Leiden and ARWU, which confine 
themselves to top 500s. Nevertheless, like the other research rankings, Scimago drives 
upward mobility primarily among institutions with growing investment in capacity.  
 
Times Higher Education (THE) 
 
The Times Higher Education ranking (THE, 2013) is similar in form to QS ranking and 
invokes similar issues; though arguably, it is managed by Thomson-Reuters at a higher 
level of competence than QS. For example, survey returns appear larger and the 
geographic coverage more effective (for QS survey problems see Sowter, 2007). The main 
strength of Times Higher is comprehensiveness. Thomson-Reuters uses 13 separated 
indicators that are weighted, scaled and pressed into the final unitary number. 
Reputational surveys for research and teaching constitute 34.5 per cent, bibliometric 
indicators 34.5 per cent, income indicators 10.75 per cent, PhD studies 8.25 per cent, 
internationalization 7.5 per cent and the student-staff ratio 4.5 per cent. Rankings in these 
different areas are not closely correlated (Cheng, 2011). As with QS there is no direct 
measure of teaching quality or learning achievement: there is a survey of reputation for 
teaching, and the student-staff ratio. The data on income for research purposes are 
incomplete and difficult to standardize across borders but arguably, are unique and 
interesting. Unfortunately, they are lost in the composite indicator. In total 73.25 per cent 
of the Times Higher ranking is constituted by one or another aspect of research 
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performance: research reputation via survey, citations, research volume, research-related 
income, international research collaboration and PhDs. Comparative research data are 
easier to gather in relation to research than teaching and service functions. Research is 
also central in shaping university reputation—as with QS, the Times Higher ranking 
appears to have been designed as a reputational table not a performance table. 
 Like QS the Times Higher ranking is weak in particularity, objectivity (one third 
reliance on survey data) materiality and externality. Data standardization and weighting 
trumps empirical observation. Externality is compromised by the scope for institutional 
influence across the 13 indicators. There are single rankings to 200 and then groupings to 
400: ordinal proportionality is stronger than QS but weaker than ARWU. As with QS there 
is annual fluctuation in ranking positions. Except to the extent marketing-related factors 
shape position, this fluctuation does not indicate bone fide capacity for mobility. Below 
the top group of universities the relationship between performance and ranking is over-
determined by many elements. There are many equally possible rankings on the basis of 
the data collected. An additional difficulty is that the index is complex. Even if random 
volatility was not a factor it would be difficult to design systems that optimize Times 
Higher ranking outcomes. Most universities seem to focus attention on boosting their 
position in the survey and negotiating with Thomson-Reuters to secure favourable data 
interpretation in areas like internationalization. There is no evidence that these 
behaviours constitute a regime of global comparison that fosters all round improvement.  
 
U-Multirank  
 
U-Multirank (2013) has several novel features. It provides the most comprehensive 
information and focuses on the information user (van Vught and Ziegele, 2011). It does 
not provide league tables but groups institutions in three performance bands. This is a 
very good outcome in terms of ordinal proportionality, though it fails to satisfy desires for 
a hierarchical set. U-Multirank collects and provides data in a large number of areas of 
teaching and learning, research and services, for both disciplines and institutions. There 
are no problems of multi-indicator weightings in that all indicators can stand alone. It is 
planned that the U-Multirank website will allows users to choose their own criteria and 
weightings when making comparisons. This radically reduces the shaping role of the 
rankings agency when compared with the Times Higher, QS and even ARWU.  
 By covering a broad set of aspects of higher education U-Multirank takes its users 
close to the materiality of higher education. The fly in the ointment is that U-Multirank’s 
comparison is especially weak in objectivity. All data are generated by survey, 
undercutting materiality, though externality is strong. The U-Multirank data explain the 
standing of institutions and disciplines, focusing on academic reputation and, more 
indirectly, student satisfaction, but do not provide comparative data on quantity or 
quality. Transparency is also weak—survey data gathering, standardization and 
interpretation are opaque to the user—though U-Multirank gains points for its use of 
customized indicators and non-normalizing weights. A performance regime based on U-
Multirank is likely to improve customer satisfaction. Whether underlying performance 
also improves is unclear. On the plus side, U-Multirank ensures institutions focus on the 
full range of activities rather than concentrating only on research; and by setting aside 
single league tables it discards the zero-sum element in ranking. A U-Multirank system of 
comparison fosters across-the-board improvement in customer satisfaction and academic 
standing (though not necessarily in the substance of activity) in all institutions. It 
constitutes the most inclusive performance regime of all the rankings discussed.  
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Conclusions 
 
It is highly desirable that social scientists, in higher education studies or other fields, 
become more active and proactive in analyzing, critiquing and proposing alternatives to, 
present university ranking systems. This should not be left to the rankers. 
In general it is preferable to use comparisons of universities that focus on the 
substance of performance, not reputation. Rankings have an irreducible reputation-
making role. It is highly desirable to ground that role in the materiality of performance, 
transparently—rather than use comparisons in which reputation drives reputation in a 
circular effect unmediated or only partly mediated by material performance. Circular 
reputational rankings function as a competition game that is an end in itself. This benefits 
only the leading institutions and does nothing to enhance teaching, research and service 
overall. Survey-based data on reputation are interesting in themselves. They contribute to 
the picture of higher education as a positional market. However, such data should be 
provided entirely separately from rankings based on quality, output or performance.  
 The most useful rankings are those closely lodged in the realities of higher education 
and using concrete measures (materiality), not filtered by survey opinion (objectivity), 
and not using data from the universities affected (externality). Within these constraints, 
the more comprehensive are the comparative data, the better. However, different 
indicators should not be combined into single multi-indicators using weights. While, 
nominally, arithmetic can combine heterogeneous data sets into one standard set, this 
violates the relationship between observation and the material high education world. 
What is apprehended is not the material world but the artificial model-world of the ranker. 
Again, this pushes the process back towards the dystopia of the ranking game as end in 
itself, breaking the virtuous nexus between ranking and performance. 
When rankers use broad bands not league tables, this reduces the normalizing effects 
of rankings, the tendency to bifurcate the ranked units between winners and losers, and 
the tendency to close off ranking competition to all but the established institutions. 
However, it is doubtful if this can still widespread desires for positional hierarchy. One 
way to provide space for emerging institutions is to develop separated rankings of such 
institutions. For developing countries with, say, a per capita income of USD $5000 p.a., 
what is to be gained by competing with countries with USD $40,000 or more?  
At present in university ranking, the strongest comparisons are confined to research. 
There global ranking has driven a widespread dynamic of increased investment in 
research capacity (Hazelkorn, 2011). Of the existing rankings Leiden and Scimago provide 
the best data in terms of social science. The ARWU collection is also useful though it 
would be better if Nobel-free. U-Multirank is state of the art in some ways—customized 
comparisons and comprehensive coverage—but sadly stymied by its reliance on surveys.  
All three of Leiden, Scimago and ARWU are limited by their focus only on research. At 
this stage there are no available valid indicators of comparative teaching quality or 
learning achievement. Because multi-indicator rankings that conflate heterogeneous 
functions into one number are invalid, it would be better if Times Higher and QS (and also 
US News and World Report, which pioneered the approach) stopped producing single 
league tables. This does not mean the data collected by multi-indicator ranking 
organizations lack value. If the Times Higher, QS and ARWU provided disaggregated data 
in the form of separate league tables, in the manner of, say, Leiden, there would be much 
interest in those data. More specific data would facilitate the evolution of targeted 
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strategies for institutional improvement and foster a more coherent relationship between 
ranking and performance.  It would also encourage mission specialization, rather than the 
normalized institutional form now generated by the combined indicator league tables. 
That is the institution that pretends to be all things to all people, grows as large as 
possible, and imitates the practices of the ideal Anglo-American research university.  
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Notes 
 
                                                        
1 Disclaimer: In ascending order of closeness of affiliation, the author is a member of the Editorial Board of 
the Times Higher Education (that is, the publication rather than the ranking), a member of the International 
Advisory Board of the Shanghai Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), and one of the authors of 
the U21 ranking of higher education systems, which is not discussed here. He considers himself free to 
comment without fear or favour in relation to all rankings, a right supported by all three organizations 
named. The present article contains criticisms of both ARWU and the Times Higher ranking. 
 
2 Opaque methodologies enable rankers to fix the exact position of one or another university by small 
changes in standardization and scaling, weights, interpretation of survey data, inclusions/exclusions of 
survey particular returns, etc. In addition QS has sought to protect itself from academic criticism by threats 
of legal action against publications carrying such criticism. The author has experienced this twice.  
 
3 QS awards individual universities four or five stars provided they undergo a QS ‘evaluation’ at a cost 
reported to be $15,000-20,000. These stars are prominently displayed on university websites as if they are 
a form of quality certification. QS has been able to create this marketing service, in the transparently bogus 
form of a formal evaluation, because of its role in global rankings.   
 
4 A notion attributed to the educational psychologist Edward Thorndike (Wikipedia, 2013). 
 
5 This indicator is no longer collected by ISI-Thomson. It will be replaced by a new indicator yet to be 
announced at the time of writing.  
 
6 Oddly, ARWU (2013) claims the Nobel alumni measure as an indicator of teaching quality. 
 
7 This means that QS staff have much scope to fix the position of any institution in the ranking if they so 
desire. 
 
